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Lucio Geller and 
Victor Tokman* 
The decade of the 1980s already has considerable 
experience of economic policies to cope with the 
crisis and its consequences, experience which should 
serve as a mandatory reference point for the formu-
lation of new action strategies. This is what the 
authors do as they make a critical assessment of the 
policies pursued, as an introduction to their own 
proposal. 
They begin by considering "recessionary adjust-
ment", describing its assumptions, measures and 
tools and the rounds of renegotiation which this 
policy has produced. They acknowledge the consider-
able reduction of the external deficit but stress the 
high cost in terms of product, employment, wages 
and investment and the inability of this policy to 
improve the terms of the debt; all of this has arisen, 
in particular, from the mistaken forecasts about the 
development of the international economy, from the 
policy's weak theoretical basis and the use of unsuita-
ble instruments. 
Given this failure, other policy options have 
been formulated to cope with the debt problem, such 
as the Baker Plan, and these too are considered. The 
authors argue that it is not possible to devise a 
universal solution because of the great variety of 
factors in play and the different ways in which they 
affect the countries of Latin America, but they stress 
the fact that the present external debt cannot be 
either paid or collected and the need to make full use 
of payment mechanisms which involve a deprecia-
tion of the capital. 
In their final section they examine the main 
aspects of the "structural adjustment" proposed 
more recently, criticizing its excessive emphasis on 
the liberalization of the external sector and the role 
of the market, and suggesting other measures to 
combine the "generation of foreign exchange" with 
the encouragement of public and private investment, 
employment and satisfaction of postponed social 
needs. 
•Staff member and Director respectively of the 
Regional Employment Programme for Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean II'HI:AI.O 
I 
Introduction 
Some of the international initiatives taken with 
respect to Latin America's external debt, in par-
ticular at the 1985 IMF meeting in Seoul, point to 
a change of emphasis in the adjustment strategy. 
The new approach focusses attention on adjust-
ment with growth, whereas the previous one 
linked adjustment with stability. The first 
approach does not replace the second but rein-
forces it. It is therefore interesting to look back 
in the analysis of the crisis and extract the main 
lessons of the adjustment policies pursued in 
recent years. 
As usual, the first topic which must be consi-
dered in connection with the financial crisis is 
that of the responsibility for the present situa-
tion. The analysis of the debt process over the 
past decade shows clearly that the responsibility 
is shared by debtors and creditors. In particular, 
the 1980 situation was caused by the reluctance 
of the Latin American countries to make the 
necessary adjustments after the first oil crisis 
(1974-1975)- The majority of the countries of 
Latin America passed through the crisis without 
any reduction in production, employment or 
wages, this being achieved thanks to the high 
level of international liquidity, the low level of 
debt which the region's countries had at that 
time, and the low inflation rate in the OECD 
countries. The developing countries were attrac-
tive customers for the excess of liquid resources 
in the international financial system originally 
produced in petrodollars. This financial liquidity 
was channelled through the private interna-
tional banks, thus changing the traditional 
nature of Latin America's external financing. 
Private financial flows began to predominate 
and this led to changes in the terms of the loans. 
The interest rates were variable and higher, and 
the repayment periods shorter. These debt 
modalities were rationalized as being a correct 
trend, for it was assumed that the private sector 
would spend these resources on productive activ-
ities which would generate the foreign exchange 
needed to meet the repayments. 
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The second oil crisis (1979) found the world 
economy and the Latin American economies in 
very different situations. Inflation was higher 
and sustained in the OECD countries, and the 
economic policy of the United States gave prio-
rity to stabilization, a goal pursued primarily by 
monetary methods. Consequently real interest 
rates climbed sharply. Moreover, the Latin Ame-
rican Governments had the worst of both 
worlds: inflation was accelerating in their coun-
tries, their indebtedness was much higher than 
in 1974, and the cost of external financing had 
increased considerably. What was even more 
serious, the external funds were out of phase: 
instead of increasing when they were most nee-
ded they declined at the first signs of the difficul-
ties of the countries of the region in servicing 
their debts (PREALC, 1985a). 
The international financial community 
began to realize the dangerous situation of deb-
tors and creditors when Mexico announced in 
August 1982 that it was unable to meet the 
payments on its external debt. The first reaction 
to the crisis was to blame the debtors, in particu-
lar for their mistaken economic policies and 
irresponsible use of external resources. The solu-
tion adopted at that time was based on two main 
assumptions. Firstly, since the situation was the 
result of wrong behaviour on the part of the 
debtors, they should bear the whole cost of the 
adjustment. Secondly, the crisis should be hand-
led as a problem of lack of liquidity and not of 
insolvency, so as to avoid the financial panic. In 
other words, there was a cash-fiow problem but 
the debtors would be able to pay the debt servi-
cing as long as they made the appropriate adjust-
ments in their economies. 
The adjustment proposed was to correct the 
external imbalance in accordance with forecasts 
that the traditional forms of adjustment would 
be successful, on the assumption that internatio-
nal trade would recover and interest rates 
decline. It thus had to be hoped that Latin Ame-
rican exports would increase both in volume and 
in price, while the restrictive domestic policies 
would hold imports down. At the same time, the 
adjustment of domestic prices would shift 
resources from the production of non-
marketable goods to the production of exporta-
ble and imported goods. In a few years the region 
would be in a position to generate the current-
account surpluses needed to avoid a collapse of 
the international financial system. 
In order to make this forecast probable it was 
necessary for the parties involved in the debt 
crisis to commit themselves to the reprogram-
ming of the debts. From 1982, indeed, all the 
countries of Latin America took part in this 
exercise, which involved postponing the repay-
ment of capital and in some cases accepting 
delays in the payment of interest. 
By the beginning of 1986 there had already 
been three debt-reprogramming rounds of diffe-
ring kinds (Devlin, 1985). There was some 
improvement in the terms of payment, although 
still insufficient for the recovery of the Latin 
American economies. The cost of the repro-
gramming declined from 2.25% in the begin-
ning to an average of 1.38% above the LIBOR 
rate. The repayment periods were extended and 
they now range from 10 to 14 years. No commis-
sions were charged in several of the latest nego-
tiations, although they were the general rule in 
the first two reprogramming rounds. The grace 
periods have been extended and they are now six 
years in the case of Mexico and Venezuela. The 
reprogramming has covered up to 65% of the 
debts owed to private banks. Although the parti-
cipation of the International Monetary Fund has 
been important in these transactions, there were 
a few cases which did not require a prior agree-
ment with that body concerning negotiation 
with the private banks. However, very little pro-
gress was made with respect to "new money". 
The new loans obtained in the 1985 negotiations 
did not reach the 1984 figure and, in any event, 
they were lower than the total interest paid by 
the region. This means that for the fourth year in 
succession Latin America is making a net trans-
fer of resources to the international private 
banks (ECLAC, 1985). 
In short, it was clear who should pay the debt 
and how payment should be made. The Latin 
American countries were to bear the burden of 
the adjustment, which would be achieved by 
modifying their levels of activity to restore 
external balance. The creditors would assist in 
this process by agreeing to reprogramme the 
debts under the supervision of the IMF but wit-
hout sacrificing their profits. Indeed, according 
to Foxley (1985), the private banks had recove-
red the position they occupied before the crisis 
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by the middle of 1985. This improvement was 
achieved by reducing the volume of new loans 
and the reinvestment of a higher proportion of 
profits to cover the risks of bankruptcy of the 
debtor countries. Meanwhile, since the crisis 
The majority of the Latin American countries 
followed the internationally agreed recipe and 
proceeded to reprogramme their debts and apply 
adjustment policies in accordance with the tradi-
tional criteria. Good results were obtained in the 
restoration of the external balance. In fact, the 
current-account deficit in Latin America's 
balance of payments declined from US$ 27 700 
million in 1980 to US$ 2 600 million in 1984. As 
a result, the balance of payments began to pro-
duce most of the resources needed to service the 
external debt. The next question is how was this 
possible. 
Although the traditional adjustment model 
was followed, the basic assumptions concerning 
both the international scenario and the prescri-
bed policies did not prove correct. There was no 
significant recovery in the world market. The 
interest rate did not decline to levels which 
would compensate fully for the deterioration in 
the terms of trade. As a result, Latin American 
exports have not increased since 1982. The 
adjustment was achieved by means of a sharp 
reduction of imports, which by 1983 had decli-
ned by 4 3 % in comparison with 1980. This 
decline was the result of the austerity policy 
pursued in that period which produced a fall of 
9% in Latin America's per capita GDP. 
This domestic austerity in turn affected the 
labour market {PREALC, 1985a). The decline in 
activity meant a slower rate of job creation and 
therefore a higher level of open unemployment. 
This open unemployment climbed to 1 1 % by 
1985. The increase was bigger than the figures 
suggest. On the one hand, the historic trend for 
the rate of open unemployment to hover around 
7% came to an abrupt end. On the other, this 
erupted the big commercial banks of the United 
States had seen an increase in their profits, in 
their share prices and in their dividends (Joint 
Economic Committee, Congress of the United 
States, 1986). 
increase occurred at the same time as a fall in the 
participation rates as a result of the lack of job 
opportunities. According to the information for 
some countries, if the participation rates had not 
declined, the rates of open unemployment would 
have been 1 % higher. Lastly, there was a change 
in the structure of unemployment: there was an 
increase in the participation of heads of family 
and, in general, of the more active age groups, 
and unemployment lasted longer. Those most 
affected were women, young people and persons 
in the older age groups. 
There was also an increase in visible unde-
remployment, measured primarily by the num-
ber of hours worked, which indicates an 
underestimate of open unemployment. The 
information available for some of the countries 
of the region indicates that open unemployment 
should be adjusted upwards by 1 % as a result of 
the visible underemployment. 
Another consequence affecting all the coun-
tries of Latin America was the drop in real wages 
—a result to be expected since wages were origi-
nally seen as a decisive factor in the traditional 
adjustment policies. The reduction of real wages 
has several purposes in this adjustment model: 
to re-establish balance in the labour market; to 
restore international competitiveness; to reduce 
inflationary pressures; and to cut back effective 
demand. The decline in real wages —caused by 
rapid inflation which eroded nominal wages— 
was also a result of the weakened negotiating 
power of labour organizations affected by the 
higher rate of open unemployment. 
In addition, there was a rapid increase in the 
occupations most vulnerable to underemploy-
ment, such as those in the informal sector, the 
II 
The effects of adjustment with stability 
38 CEPAL REVIEW No. 30 / December 1986 
public sector, small businesses and services. The 
corresponding average incomes also declined. 
The importance and the interrelationship of 
these employment and income factors were dif-
ferent in each country. In some countries, the 
effect of the adjustment was felt mainly in an 
increase in open unemployment and in lower 
real wages, while in others its main effect was on 
employment in the sectors mentioned. The 
redistributive impact of these different forms of 
adjustment varied in each situation. The weakest 
redistributive effect was produced in those cases 
in which the adjustment led primarily to an 
increase in open unemployment. The least 
harmful results were produced when the adjust-
ment was achieved by means of increases in 
informal employment and declines in average 
incomes. This latter form of adjustment opera-
tes as an unemployment insurance paid by the 
poor in the countries which do not have protec-
tion systems. 
Lastly, the crisis jeopardized future employ-
ment levels by reducing public and private 
investment. Public investment suffered as a 
result of the decision to correct the fiscal deficits, 
and all the more so in those countries which 
showed the greatest reluctance to reduce public 
expenditure. Roads, bridges, railways, storage 
facilities and basic services in the urban centres 
deteriorated without the necessary reinvestment 
being made in the majority of cases. The same 
The readjustment policies laid down in the debt 
reprogramming did not have the predicted 
results. While it is true that the external imba-
lance was corrected, this was achieved only at a 
high domestic price paid mainly by the poorest 
sectors. This failure can be attributed to mista-
ken calculations and unforeseen factors in the 
analysis of the possible international situation 
and to the faulty theoretical bases of the adjust-
ment policies recommended. 
thing happened with private investment, espe-
cially in machinery and equipment. It is not easy 
to recover the lost ground: businessmen are 
anything but optimistic and real domestic inte-
rest rates are high. The way out of the crisis 
which combines the solution of the debt problem 
with an increase in employment levels depends 
on our countries producing more, i.e., on their 
making better use of their productive resources 
and investing on a sustained basis. 
In 1984 there was an improvement in Latin 
America's indicators, but this was not repeated 
in 1985. Following the recovery of the world 
economy, mainly in the United States, economic 
activity revived in Latin America and was accom-
panied by increases of 11% in the value of 
exports and 5% in the value of imports. Howe-
ver, the 1985 figures show a discouraging deve-
lopment in the countries of the region as a whole 
which is all the greater if Brazil and Cuba are 
excluded from the calculations. The volumes of 
exports and imports declined in that year, the 
terms of trade deteriorated, and the growth rate 
of the per capita product was negative if those 
two countries are not included (ECLAC, 1985). 
Furthermore, no result for 1984 and 1985 
shows an improvement in the conditions in the 
labour markets. Some countries achieved reduc-
tions in open unemployment, while in others the 
situation continued to deteriorate. In the majo-
rity of the countries for which information is 
available real wages continued to fall. 
The world economy did not recover as fore-
casted in the 1982 and 1983 studies. The increase 
in the volume of Latin American exports was 
fully offset by the deterioration in the terms of 
trade. Although the indicators recovered in 
1984, the process was not sustained and proved 
insufficient. The interest rate remained at into-
lerable levels during the first years of 
adjustment. 
I l l 
Adjustment with stability: the lessons of experience 
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The financing of the fiscal and external 
imbalances of the United States led to a high 
interest rate (which was swiftly transferred to 
the international financial market) and to the 
overvaluation of the dollar. The United States 
became the principal debtor in the world eco-
nomy, even when only the foreign creditors are 
taken into account. The overvaluation impaired 
the international competitiveness ofUnitedSta-
tes production. The result is an imbalance in the 
external accounts which will have to be corrected 
when the loans mature. The United States also 
has domestic problems in sustaining the level of 
activity and employment (Bergsten, 1985; Tava-
res, 1985). An initial change in the economic 
policy has produced a defacto devaluation of the 
dollar by means of intervention agreements with 
the monetary authorities of the central countries 
in the money markets. More recently monetary 
policy has been made more flexible in order to 
permit a reduction in interest rates. Both actions 
are designed to sustain the expansion of the 
United States economy. In addition, the United 
States Congress has been under growing pres-
sure to set up protectionist barriers. If it yields to 
this pressure, the other industrialized countries 
will certainly take counter measures. In any 
event, the volumes and prices of Latin American 
exports would be harmed as happened in the 
case of Argentina's agricultural exports when 
the United States Government decided to pro-
tect its farmers with subsidies. In short, the 
directions taken by United States economic 
policy will affect international developments in 
the near future. 
The uncertainty about the economic policy 
of the central countries, and of the United States 
in particular, has introduced an element of inef-
ficiency in the reprogramming of loans, for the 
creditor countries have not been obliged to 
create favourable international conditions to 
solve the debt problem of the developing coun-
tries. Some signs of recognition of this uncer-
tainty began to appear recently: the 
reprogramming agreement signed by Venezuela 
with the private banks included a contingency 
clause providing for a new reprogramming exer-
cise in the event of further falls in the oil price. 
For the same reasons Mexico too has tried to 
negotiate with the IMF to ensure that its latest 
adjustment programme should include anticycli-
cal loans. 
Another factor which impaired the effi-
ciency of debt reprogramming was the wish of 
the international private banking system to 
accept only new timetables for cash flows. Even 
for so little the price was high. The private banks 
increased the margin added to the LIBOR rate and 
introduced an additional financial charge for 
renegotiation. Moreover, in the majority of cases 
the private banks obtained public guarantees of 
earlier loans even though they had been made to 
the private sector of the Latin American coun-
tries. These benefits were not accompanied by 
new loans. On the contrary, there was a clear 
reduction in the new funds made available by the 
private banks, taking into account the need to 
reduce their net participation in investment, the 
increase in bank reserves and the increase in 
loans merely for the payment of interest (Foxley, 
1985). It was against this background of uncer-
tainty and contraction of international lending 
that the IMF tried to impose its conditional 
terms. The second lesson to be drawn from the 
application of the policies of adjustment with 
stability is that the basic theory did not corres-
pond to reality. When a country has an external 
imbalance, the traditional analysis assigns the 
blame to an excess of domestic expenditure and 
the loss of international competitiveness when 
changes in the exchange rate and domestic infla-
tion are out of phase. The solution proposed is to 
reduce expenditure by means of policies of 
monetary and fiscal restraint and to restore com-
petitiveness by adjusting relative prices to pro-
mote the production of marketable goods. The 
main tool for attainment of this latter objective 
is devaluation. This traditional approach was 
then extended to include situations in which the 
current-account imbalances resulted from inter-
nal problems (increases in real wages above 
increases in productivity) or external ones (dete-
rioration in the terms of trade). The combina-
tion of policies does not differ greatly in either 
situation, except that in the case of external 
factors the monetary and fiscal policies should 
not be so restrictive as to soften the impact of the 
decline in real wages on the production of non-
marketable goods (Ahamed, 1986). 
It was originally maintained that the reces-
sion and the regressive distribution of income 
resulting from the fall in real wages were not 
necessary results since devaluation acts as an 
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incentive to export and thus becomes a force for 
economic expansion, and since the changes in 
relative prices in favour of marketable goods do 
not necessarily entail an increase in the cost of 
living, which is the representative indicator used 
in the analysis of real wages. This theoretical and 
practical stance was called in question as soon as 
its assumptions were analysed in the context of 
the Latin American economies (PREALC, 1985a 
and 1985c; Meller and Solimano, 1985). 
The Latin American countries have a high 
degree of structural heterogeneity, which means 
that the differences in productivity between and 
within sectors are higher than in the central 
economies. There is thus little elasticity in 
supply and this means in turn that the produc-
tion system is slower to react to policy changes. 
The traditional theory holds that the production 
system is very sensitive, but the positive effects 
of expansion and reallocation of resources are 
not felt in the short term. This conclusion leads 
to the second argument about the effects of 
devaluation. 
It is obvious that the package of adjustment 
measures would definitely promote recession 
unless it included devaluation as a tool of expan-
sion. However, some studies on Latin American 
countries indicate that the expansionist effect of 
a devaluation is not felt for two years, so that it 
produces recession in the short term. 
There are several reasons why economies do 
not react immediately and positively to devalua-
tion. Devaluation is less effective in a situation of 
universal international recession and growing 
protectionism and when it is used at the same 
time by the majority of the debtor countries in 
urgent need of foreign exchange. Moreover, the 
foreign trade structure of the Latin American 
economies is dominated by exports of commodi-
ties and foodstuffs which have poor demand 
elasticity. Manufactures still represent a small 
proportion of total exports. This reduces the 
effect of devaluation on exports. In the case of 
imports (with the exception of certain countries 
in which consumer goods represent a substantial 
proportion), the main components are raw 
materials, intermediate products and capital 
goods. Domestic demand is relatively unrespon-
sive to prices and the only means of reducing 
these imports is to cut back production. If the 
price elasticity of the trade balance is low and 
does not meet the Marshall-Lerner condition, 
devaluation worsens the trade balance in the 
short term. Lastly, devaluation has a further res-
trictive influence on effective demand. On the 
one hand, consumer prices move in step with the 
devaluation and real wages fall unless money 
wages are fully indexed. Since this is rarely the 
case, effective demand declines. On the other 
hand, the inflationary effect of devaluation pro-
duces a rise in interest rates. Since the greater 
part of the private sector is heavily indebted in 
the national currency and in dollars, the devalua-
tion means an increase in financial costs. The 
private sector cannot react by increasing produc-
tion because it has to cope with these financial 
restrictions aggravated by the limitations impo-
sed on monetary expansion. 
Another problem of these adjustment mea-
sures is their lack of selectivity. This produces 
excessive contraction. The proposed policies are 
based on the use of a few universal instruments. 
However, owing to structural differences, some 
sectors will receive excessive profits while 
others will not have enough. This example is 
very clear when devaluation is used as a means of 
stimulating exports. It can be redundant in the 
case of traditional exports but insufficient to 
promote exports of manufactures. 
Some recent works have concluded with a 
partial recognition of the force of these criti-
cisms. For example, it has been accepted that the 
effects of devaluation on production are uncer-
tain and depend in the end in the structure of the 
economy and the terms of the devaluation. In 
other words, the question is empirical rather 
than theoretical (Ahamed, 1986). Other analyses 
accept that the adjustment programmes reduce 
short-term absorption but argue that this con-
traction should not be seen as a cost since the 
affected economy was engaged in a process of 
rapid but unsustainable growth. The adjustment 
programmes ought to set the economies on the 
road to stable and sustained medium-term 
growth by means of the incentives which they 
offer for saving and domestic investment (Khan 
and Knight, 1985). However, the validity of this 
proposition has not been verified. Saving does 
not seem to be very sensitive to the interest rate 
and large increases would have to be made in 
that variable to produce any change in the saving 
coefficient. Furthermore, even allowing that 
FROM AUSTERITY MEASURES TO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT / L. Geller and V. Tokman 41 
saving increases, it is not clear that they go into 
investment if the interest rate remains at very 
high real levels. This possibility has been recog-
nized but only for the short term; beyond that, 
the time relationship between saving and invest-
ment would have beneficial effects on medium-
term investment, always provided that the 
economic policy ensures that the interest rate 
remains positive (Molho, 1986). The temporal 
connection between saving and investment is 
probable in the case of a normally imbalanced 
The negative effects on production and employ-
ment generated by the adverse international 
conditions and the adjustment strategy adopted 
to cope with the problem of external debt were 
not accompanied by any significant improve-
ment in the debt indicators. 
The ratio of external debt to exports for the 
whole of Latin America remained at the same 
high level (4.0) in 1985 as in 1983 (3.9). The 
indicators for Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Peru 
were higher than these averages and deteriora-
ted between the two years. In contrast, the 
increases in the exports of Brazil and Colombia 
brought about an improvement in the ratio in 
this period. 
The differences between countries suggest a 
need for a case by case analysis which cannot be 
undertaken in this paper. The following conside-
rations apply therefore to the region as a whole. 
The performance of the ratio of external debt to 
exports is attributed to a reduction in the growth 
rate of the central economies and a decline in 
international commodities. A recent study 
argues that the minimum growth rate of the 
industrialized countries would have to be 4.5% 
for the exports of the debtor countries to recover 
(Massad, 1985). In the first forecasts prepared to 
assess the viability of solving the debt problem 
by exclusively market means it was concluded 
that a growth rate of 3% in the central econo-
mies would be sufficient to stimulate the exports 
situation, but improbable in the present critical 
conditions when increases in saving go on the 
payment of interest on the external debt. These 
considerations would suggest that a theory of 
stable and sustained growth would be better ser-
ved by an investment theory which places grea-
ter emphasis on profit factors and frees the 
interest rate from its function of adjusting the 
balance of payments and shifts it to this appro-
priate sphere of investment decisions. 
of the debtor countries (Cline, 1983)- The 
growth of the OECD countries was originally 
estimated at around 3% for 1986, an estimate 
which seems very optimistic in view of the slug-
gish performance of the United States economy 
in the first half of the year. In these circumstan-
ces, the prospects of Latin American exports do 
not seem very rosy. 
Of even greater importance than this finan-
cial indicator of the capacity to pay is the ratio of 
external debt to gross product, which measures 
the debt burden on the production capacity of the 
debtor countries. Between 1983 and 1985 Latin 
America's external debt increased by 7%, while 
the gross domestic product increased at a slower 
rate (6%). The indicators for Argentina, Chile 
and Peru showed a tendency to decline, while 
those for Mexico, Colombia and Brazil, espe-
cially the latter two countries, showed an 
improvement. 
It can thus be concluded that the liquidity and 
solvency indicators (measured partly by the two 
ratios mentioned above) have deteriorated for 
the region as a whole. The heterogeneity of debt 
situations is evidence, in any event, that the 
criteria used up to now do not have universal 
validity as means of solving the debtors' pro-
blems. Even for Brazil and Colombia the net 
payments of profits and interest remain a very 
heavy burden on their exports and their gross 
domestic product. The fact that some countries 
IV 
Adjustment without settlement of the 
external debt problem 
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have improved their debt situation does not 
excuse the international community or the deb-
tor countries from the obligation to take more 
decisive action to solve this problem. 
The issue of external debt seems to be bog-
ged down. If the debtor countries, or some of 
them, decided to interrupt payment of debt ser-
vicing, the counter measures taken by the credi-
tors might affect the growth rate of exports and 
the gross product of the countries concerned. 
The interruption would in turn lead to a devalua-
tion of the bank loans, which could be re-bought 
by the debtor countries. This result came about 
in fact in the 1930s and laid the foundation for 
the importance which the Latin American coun-
tries attach to their financial commitments. 
Most of the studies conclude that the costs asso-
ciated with a moratorium are higher than the 
benefits, for the uncertainty about the chain of 
actions and reactions set in motion by a morato-
rium adds a greater specific weight to costs 
(Krugman, 1985; Simonsen, 1985). However, as 
Diaz-Alejandro (1985) has pointed out, a unila-
teral moratorium is becoming increasingly 
attractive in the light of the meagre progress 
achieved in the overall situation and the fore-
casts of stagnation up to the end of the present 
decade. 
If on the other hand the interruption of the 
payment of interest and capital was not unilate-
ral but agreed between debtors and creditors for 
a determined period, as Prebisch suggested to 
the United States Congress, in order to enable 
the debtor countries to resume their growth, it 
would take a long time for the solvency and 
liquidity indicators to return to their historical 
levels. This period is in direct proportion to the 
initial magnitude of the ratio of external debt to 
gross domestic product or exports, to future inte-
rest rates and to the objective difficulties of res-
toring growth or winning external markets, and 
it is in indirect proportion to the international 
inflation rate. However, this solution is not 
attractive to the international banks which 
would have to lend involuntary at a rhythm 
determined by interest rates. 
The private creditors, for their part, insist 
that the debtor countries should generate a sur-
plus on their trade balances sufficient to pay the 
interest at least, and they are not prepared to 
make new loans. In the banks' view, the interna-
tional inflation rate and the growth rates of the 
gross domestic product or exports, no matter 
how low, would help to improve the solvency 
and liquidity of the debtors. It is clear that this 
approach assumes that the repayment of the 
debt should be completely reprogrammed and 
brought into line with the fact demonstrated by 
experience that the present external debt cannot 
be collected or paid. The key factor determining 
whether the debtor countries can bear the debt is 
a reduction in international interest rates. A 
certain downward trend is visible in the money 
markets of the central economies, especially 
since the United States Monetary authorities 
agreed to relax some of the criteria governing 
the expansion of the money supply in the light of 
that country's present economic weakness. 
However, this process takes time, for the reduc-
tion of interest rates requires co-ordination of 
the monetary policies of several central coun-
tries. Unilateral action by the United States 
would be incompatible with the size of its fiscal 
and external deficits, which require financing 
from the rest of the world. In addition, this 
process has a lower limit determined by the 
difficulty of correcting these United States defi-
cits, since its economy has lost its external com-
petitiveness and its authorities are persisting 
with the political policies underlying the fiscal 
imbalances. 
But this is not the whole story. It has always 
been maintained, and it remains true, that the 
growth capacity of the Latin American countries 
depends to a large degree on their import capa-
city. This means that harmonization of the strict 
payment of interest and an increase ¡n import 
capacity depends on the growth of exports. 
Increased exports are dependent to a large 
extent on the growth capacity of the central 
economies and on their political will to remove 
the protectionism affecting the exports of the 
debtor countries. It is doubtful whether this 
growth can take place at an adequate rate, and 
there is little manifestation of the political will 
to achieve this. If the debtor countries sought to 
overcome these difficulties by limiting the pay-
ment of interest to a fraction of their exports, the 
private international banks would be compelled 
to lend against their will, and this would run 
counter to their policy of reducing their net par-
ticipation in lending to the developing countries. 
As can be seen, the solution of the external 
problem is subject to such a large number of 
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variables that it is very difficult to guarantee a 
universal solution. A lower oil price helps to 
reduce inflationary pressures and leads to lower 
interest rates. These results are favourable to the 
debtor countries, especially for oil importers, but 
harmful to oil exporters, and they also bring 
about a reduction of international liquidity. A 
monetary policy designed to bring interest rates 
down benefits the debtor countries, always pro-
vided there is no reaction against stagnation or 
recession in the central countries to cancel out 
the advantages to the developing countries. The 
lack of a universal solution should be acknowled-
ged through a greater supply of new credits, but 
the private banks do not seem disposed to grant 
them. The result is clear as the day: the solvency 
and liquidity indicators are stationary for all the 
debtor countries; the contradictory situation has 
been reached in which the developing countries 
are transferring real resources to the developed 
countries (US$ 100 000 million in the last four 
years); the joint responsibility of debtors and 
creditors is a dead letter. 
The Baker Plan, presented by the United 
States Treasury Secretary in October 1985 in 
Seoul, acknowledges this situation: the proposal 
admits that there is no solution to the problem 
without additional liquid resources. The structu-
ral changes needed if adjustment with growth is 
to happen require new financing. The increased 
liquid resources and the reprogramming of the 
debts imply a policy of partial refinancing of 
interest. The Baker Plan is also designed to 
strengthen conditionally, giving greater weight 
to the World Bank and to the regional multilate-
ral lending institutions. It is proposed that the 
World Bank should maintain closer collabora-
tion with the IMF in the allocation of its loans. In 
these conditions it would be possible to increase 
the loans of the multilateral banks to the main 
debtors by about 50% in the first three years of 
the application of this policy, without any need 
to call for new inputs of capital for these institu-
tions. The World Bank would also act as guaran-
tor of investments involving non-commercial 
risks through a recently established body (Multi-
lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)). 
The World Bank has been making structural 
adjustment loans since 1980, but the Bank's 
administration has imposed restrictions on 
these loans, which may not exceed a limit 10% of 
new commitments or represent a significant 
proportion (more than 30 to 40%) of the loans 
made to each country (Bacha and Feinberg, 
1986). In consequence, the World Bank made 
only 16 transactions of this kind in the first five 
years, and seven of them concerned five Latin 
American countries (Bolivia, Guayana, Panama, 
Costa Rica, and Jamaica on three occasions). 
This small number of transactions was not due 
only to the earlier decisions of the World Bank, 
which it is now trying to correct, but also to the 
fact that the developing countries were not very 
anxious to commit themselves to a' double condi-
tionally. The structural adjustment loans 
require that the recipient countries shall have 
entered into commitments with the IMF and they 
have recently been the object of increasing 
demand from several other countries of the 
region. 
From the point of view of the multilateral 
lending institutions, this greater insistence on 
structural adjustments is justified. The IMF 
began to concern itself with these matters in the 
1970s when it became apparent that many exter-
nal imbalances were not the result of an excess of 
demand or of faulty management of foreign-
exchange policy, but rather of problems of 
supply resulting from the failure of certain eco-
nomies to adapt to the changes occurring in the 
international economy. However, the IMF could 
not delve deeply into these matters for various 
reasons —realizing, for example, that the politi-
cal difficulties of negotiating with the countries 
which sought its loans would be fewer if it did 
not encroach on their sovereignty by going into 
the details of the goals and tools of economic 
policy. Its operations would be easier if the dis-
cussions were limited to global goals and tools. 
Furthermore, in its lending practice the IMF had 
not developed the necessary experience to tackle 
all the problems connected with the increase of 
global supply. 
The sectoral loans of the World Bank had 
always been subject to conditions, but the 
reforms which it recommended had to be in 
keeping with its mandate of promoting the 
development of productive resources. For this 
reason, the Bank's theoretical and professional 
practice was not capable of replacing the IMF 
when the external imbalances were caused by 
factors not connected with supply. 
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Some of the contradictions could be removed 
by means of complementary action and co-
operation between the two multilateral institu-
tions. For example, the World Bank required 
Argentina to reduce its export duties before 
agreeing to a loan for that country's agriculture 
negotiated in 1986. Realizing that this measure 
could prejudice the commitments signed by 
Argentina with the Fund to reduce its fiscal 
deficit, the Bank devised another measure: repla-
cing export duties with a tax on income from 
landholding. Furthermore, many debtor coun-
tries are not prepared to enter into agreements 
with the IMF but they would be less unwilling to 
do so with the World Bank. These new trends 
are not without their difficulties. The IMF autho-
rities do not seem very willing to participate in 
the monitoring of structural adjustment pro-
grammes in which it has not played a leading 
role. Nor are the World Bank's conditions easy 
for the debtor countries to accept —in particular, 
the Bank's objections to State enterprises, its 
desire for rapid adjustments, its habit of promo-
ting far-reaching reforms without adequate 
knowledge of the situation in the country concer-
ned, and its occasional attribution of excessive 
importance to efficiency without taking into 
account the employment problem or the basic 
needs (Bacha and Feinberg, 1986). 
But these are not the only difficulties which 
the Baker Plan has to overcome, there is another 
more contentious one: the Plan originally requi-
red the commitment of the commercial banks to 
offer new loans over the next three years in the 
amount of US$ 20 000 million. Since the private-
bank debt of the 15 main debtors covered by the 
Plan was US$ 275 000 million at the end of 1984 
(75 million short-term and the rest long-term), 
The original merit of the Baker Plan was its 
recognition of the political content of the rela-
tions between debtors and creditors which justi-
fied official intervention. Up till then, the Policy 
of the United States Government had been one 
the effort required from the banks was to 
increase their net participation in these invest-
ments at an annual rate of 2.5%, an apparently 
small increase. The net long-term credits (for 
periods longer than 12 months) received by the 
10 Latin American countries which may opt for 
the Baker Plan amounted to US$ 12 000 million 
in 1983 alone. However, a very large proportion 
of these loans was made involuntary. Further-
more, and in accordance with the World Bank's 
forecasts, these 10 Latin American countries 
would have to pay interest amounting to more 
than US$ 32 000 million to the private banks 
between 1986 and 1988; the figures proposed in 
the Baker Plan are therefore difficult for the 
private banks to accept and insufficient for the 
debtor countries. 
An additional difficulty in the implementa-
tion of this proposal is that it would restrict the 
independence which the commercial banks have 
had in all the reprogramming operations if anot-
her institution had to be set up to administer 
these financial resources. The commercial banks 
are very wary and not willing to commit them-
selves before the governments of the other cen-
tral countries do so and until they are certain as 
to the nature of these commitments. In particu-
lar, the commercial banks are watchful of the 
official initiatives for commercial loans to be 
made on more favourable payment terms and for 
modification of the banking regulations to allow 
a greater net participation in the loans. The 
participation of the big banks also depends on a 
favourable commitment on the part of the banks 
(some 150 of them) which account for 8 5 % of 
the external debt with private financial institu-
tions. Meanwhile, time is slipping away and the 
Baker Plan is in decline. 
of non-involvement, on the ground that the 
issue of foreign debt was an essentially private 
one. The wider role assigned to the World Bank 
in the achievement of structural adjustment was 
also important. However, these advantages did 
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not offset the weaknesses: the Plan's content had 
not been discussed in depth with other creditors 
(hence the difficulties of instrumentation); the 
Plan applies to only a few countries; the new 
resources are clearly insufficient; and the solu-
tion includes not one original element which 
would bring definite relief for the 15 debtors 
covered by the Plan. It is not surprising that this 
proposal of the United States Treasury Secretary 
has become so diluted that he is trying to disasso-
ciate his name from the Plan. 
The Baker Plan has been strongly criticized 
by the United States Congress. A group of 
experts prepared a report for the Joint Economic 
Committee (1986) which linked the external 
debt crisis of the Latin American countries with 
the decline in export prices and the damage 
caused to United States farmers, especially in the 
wheat, maize and soya markets. This decline in 
international prices was caused by the need of 
the debtor countries to obtain foreign exchange 
for their financial payments, even at the cost of 
neglecting the food requirements of their peo-
ples. On the other hand, the big commercial 
banks in the United States have improved their 
profitability. A situation has been reached, the 
report goes on, in which the United States 
Government has compensated the institutions 
which played an important role in precipitating 
the financial crisis and has punished the produc-
tive sectors which bore no responsibility for it. 
The report says that the Baker Plan does not 
offer a fundamental solution representing an 
advance over earlier policies, for it does not focus 
on the true dilemma of economic growth and 
interest payment. The Committee's report the-
refore recommends reducing interest rates, limi-
ting interest payments to a specific proportion 
of the export income of the debtor countries 
(25%), and awarding a conditional devaluation 
of the debts of those countries which meet these 
objectives ( 1 % a year for 10 years). The report 
estimates that this policy could reduce the inte-
rest payments of Latin America by US$ 12 000 
million a year from 1985, which would facilitate 
the increase of imports without which it is diffi-
cult to sustain a development process. Another 
work (Orlando and Teitel, 1985) also concludes 
that the increase in import capacity implicit in 
the Baker Plan permits the Latin American 
countries only very moderate growth and there-
fore an expansion of employment smaller than 
the growth of the labour force. 
It is important that reports such as the ones 
described should begin to be given a public hea-
ring, as has been done by Senator Bradley and 
Mrs. Fitzpatrick, at a time when signs of fatigue 
are already appearing in the Latin American 
countries and are leading in some cases to grea-
ter political tensions. Peru has been declared 
unqualified to receive new loans from the IMF; 
the decision of the United States Government to 
sell subsidized grain to the Soviet Union has 
stirred up political sectors in Argentina, inclu-
ding the military, which are calling for a change 
in the strategy for the negotiation of the external 
debt; Venezuela had to invoke the contingency 
clause in an agreement concluded with private 
banks scarcely two months after its signature, 
when oil prices continued to decline; Mexico has 
initiated a new reprogramming exercise with 
the IMF and the private banks in order to cope 
with the low oil prices and the political require-
ment for a return to growth in 1987 after the 
contraction of 1986; Brazil has postponed its 
renegotiation with the Paris Club owing to the 
demand of its official creditors that it should 
conclude an agreement with the IMF, a demand 
which Brazil had circumvented in its negotia-
tions with the private banks (Financial Report, 
1986). 
This story is repeated time after time in the 
other Latin American countries. Every case 
demonstrates that from the stand point of the 
national interest (which is more general than 
that of the private commercial banks), the exter-
nal debt cannot be paid or collected. For the debt 
to be paid, the debtor countries would have to 
generate a trade-balance surplus equivalent to a 
net transfer of resources incompatible with their 
status as developing countries. For the debt to be 
collected, the creditor countries would have to 
tolerate a trade-balance deficit equivalent to a 
reduction by an equal amount in the profits of 
their productive sectors (Geller and Vuskovic, 
1983). While the external debt is a dead weight 
in the sense that a very large part of it represents 
an outflow of capital, the interest payments are 
simply a transfer of income and not remunera-
tion for productive services. 
All the criteria used in the renegotiation of 
the debt, including the studies which produced 
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optimistic forecasts of the feasibility of servicing 
the debt, are designed to intervene in the free 
play of market forces. Given the fiction of repro-
gramming which merely replaces old loans with 
new ones without supplying new financing and 
of loans whose only purpose is to complete the 
payment of interest, the credits remain on the 
books at their nominal value, which is higher 
than the current quotations in the secondary 
markets. In June 1986 the promissory notes of 
the external debt of the Latin American coun-
tries were quoted below their nominal value 
(Colombia 85%; Venezuela 78%; Brazil 77%; 
Uruguay 72%; Chile 69%; Argentina 66%; 
Mexico 60%). As a matter of simple arithmetic, 
it would be advantageous for the debtor coun-
tries to apply their trade-balance surplus to 
paying off the debt instead of paying interest. 
The development of a secondary lending market 
has been opposed with the argument that the 
debtor countries would be given an incentive to 
have deliberate recourse to moratorium. This 
market might stop undervaluing the loans, and 
interest rates would be forced upwards (Simon-
sen, 1985). However, the accumulation of reser-
ves by the banks means a de facto marking-up of 
For the moment, the political negotiations are 
not proceeding along these lines. From different 
angles the recent discussions in international 
circles, especially since the Seoul meeting, have 
placed the emphasis on structural adjustment to 
cope with the problem of external debt. The 
Baker Plan introduced other considerations, in 
addition to the financial ones, which we have 
already commented on. They acknowledge the 
failure of the adjustment with stability which 
was tried in the period 1982-1985 and, what is 
perhaps even more important, they recognize 
that any relief will be temporary unless structu-
ral changes are made. Structural imbalance has 
been under discussion for a long time in Latin 
America. The experience of the past 10 years 
the loans. The point now is that there should be a 
corresponding depreciation of the debts of the 
countries of the region. Without this deprecia-
tion it is going to be very difficult to find a 
permanent solution to the problem of the exter-
nal debt, especially a solution in which the banks 
actually assume their share of the responsibility 
(Geller, 1983). If this depreciation could be 
agreed between debtors and creditors, the cost-
benefit ratio for the world economy would be 
increased to the maximum. It really is a question 
of negotiating a solution that allows this practice 
which is already being used by some countries 
(Chile is one example) to become universal, so 
that a part of the debt is recovered by selling 
assets of enterprises operating in the country to 
purchasers of external debt notes quoted below 
their nominal value in the secondary markets. 
For the moment, this practice implies definite 
advantages for certain private national sectors or 
the denationalization of domestic assets when 
the purchasers are foreign investors. It is thus 
necessary to find other solutions which extend 
these advantages to the public sector as well and 
reduce the risks of denationalization of enterpri-
ses in the debtor countries. 
with the adoption of neo-liberal doctrine in the 
economic policy of the majority of the countries 
of the region, especially those of the Southern 
Cone, was the result of a questioning of the 
traditional patterns of economic development 
followed by those countries. The crisis interrup-
ted the liberalization process, which was already 
exhibiting some of its main shortcomings. 
However, economic analysis since the crisis 
seems to be reviving the positions argued at the 
beginning of the 1970s without taking into con-
sideration the nature and number of these 
shortcomings. 
The basic goals of the proposed model are to 
move the economies towards free trade, which 
means liberalizing the external sector and alio-
VI 
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wing greater play to the laws of the market. In 
both cases the purpose is to ensure a better 
allocation of resources and to enable the private 
sector to assume the primary responsibility in 
the accumulation process. These goals are per-
manent ones but they are now being consolida-
ted by the crisis. It is thought that the 
liberalization of the external sector is the only 
possible way in which the countries of Latin 
America can generate the necessary foreign 
exchange to pay their external debts. Moreover, 
government intervention is interpreted as inter-
ference in relative prices and distortion of 
resource allocation. The State is thus competing 
with private enterprises and impairing their 
accumulation capacity. 
The proposed policy is based on increasing 
exports, and a set of measures is proposed for 
this purpose, including currency devaluation and 
tariff reductions. In particular, this reduction 
would reduce the cost of producing exports and 
would oblige domestic producers to increase 
their productivity in order to compete with 
imports. An effort is also being made to reduce 
the public sector deficit, mainly by cutting public 
expenditure but also by eliminating the price 
controls and subsidies which produce distortion. 
There is no doubt that, not only in times of 
crisis but also in the periods of economic growth 
experienced by the Latin American countries, 
high priority should be given to the generation 
of foreign exchange. There is no great disagree-
ment on this point. The problem lies in the 
instruments which are recommended. As has 
been argued above, devaluation can have its 
effect limited by the characteristics of Latin 
America's productive systems, while tariff 
reduction has shown a marked bias against 
employment, as was clearly the case in the trade-
liberalization programmes of the 1970s, particu-
larly in the manufacturing sector. 
The questioning of policies does not necessa-
rily mean returning to the instruments of the 
past or to the way in which they were used. On 
the contrary, development thinking in Latin 
America is being continuously renewed and criti-
cal examination of past experience suggests that 
there was an abuse of protection as a means of 
stimulating domestic production. In particular, 
this universal protection did not discriminate 
among activities and led to the production of a 
great assortment of goods with high levels of 
inefficiency, as well as affecting the export capa-
city of non-traditional goods. 
However, since the world economy is not 
recovering the rapid growth rates of the past, 
access to international markets will be neither 
easy nor stable. For this reason alone it will not 
be sufficient to rely exclusively on prices to sti-
mulate exports. Internationa] trade is increa-
singly conducted by means of direct negotiations 
between countries (the recent agreement bet-
ween Argentina and Brazil is one example). 
Consequently, other instruments will acquire 
increasing importance and will have to be expli-
citly included in the policies. This does not mean 
that there is no place for the use of the traditio-
nal instruments. The question is how to do it. Of 
course, the main objective is to generate foreign 
exchange, but it'is also to ensure a high level of 
employment, so that it is necessary to identify 
the activities which can offer advantages in the 
world markets and contribute to rapid growth in 
employment. 
Several proposals have been put forward in 
Latin America along these lines, notably the 
proposal of Ffrench-Davis (1985) that the tools 
of trade policy should be used selectively. This 
proposal requires the selective use of tariffs, 
with greater protection for the activities which 
can generate most jobs. This will eliminate the 
discrimination against jobs contained in the libe-
ralization policies. The probable cost increase 
which might discourage exports could be offset 
by a subsidy which would form part of the poli-
cies. In addition, there would have to be a high 
and stable exchange rate, e.i., neither fixed nor 
entirely floating exchange rates should be adop-
ted (to avoid in the latter case unnecessary fluc-
tuations in this decisive price). It is therefore 
proposed that variations in the exchange rate 
should be regulated in accordance with medium-
term forecasts of the balance of payments. 
The second objective is based on the assump-
tion that the private sector will react positively 
to a reduction in State participation. The Latin 
American experience does not offer grounds for 
optimism in this respect. Analysis of the invest-
ment process over the last 30 years (Tokman, 
1985) shows the lack of independence in the 
accumulation process. Although investment in 
Latin America has been high, at least in compari-
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son with the central countries, it depended very 
much on foreign investment and external finan-
cing. In fact, instead of the direct foreign invest-
ment of the 1950s, external financing came to 
predominate in the 1970s. This significant pro-
portion of external investment or financing in 
domestic investment means that part of the con-
trol over the direction of the accumulation pro-
cess is not in the hands of the countries of the 
region. 
Analysis of the investment process shows 
that the public sector has accounted for a large 
part of capital formation. For Latin America as a 
whole the proportion of public investment in 
total investment has been three times higher 
than it was in the United States at the beginning 
of the century. In some countries of the region 
this proportion is over 50%. It can be concluded 
that not only have many of the decisions been 
taken outside the country but that internally the 
public sector has played a large part in the accu-
mulation process. It can also be concluded that 
the private agents who supposedly ought to be 
the leaders in the process of economic growth 
have not fulfilled that function in recent decades. 
These data could also be interpreted to mean 
that private investment was not dynamic 
because of excessive public intervention. The 
experience of the 1970s in the Southern Cone, 
and in Chile in particular, indicates that this 
interpretation and the consequent reduction of 
public investment prompted no reaction from 
the private sector, except for heavy financial 
speculation. The history of investment in Latin 
America suggests that in many countries the 
public sector has had to make investments in 
areas in which the private sector was not inter-
ested. This is certainly the recent experience in 
Brazil. 
In the long term the lack of reaction on the 
part of private businesses may be accentuated by 
the crisis. The outward-looking strategy may 
stimulate a small number of businesses. At the 
same time, according to Foxley (1985), the 
micro-economic conditions are too weak to sus-
tain investment. Companies are heavily in debt 
and they are paying interest rates generally two 
or three times higher than the international rate, 
and the macro-economic conditions are restrict-
ing the markets. The result is that companies are 
not only incapable of investing but also cannot 
solve their own debt problems. 
Here the experience of Brazil is illuminat-
ing. The Brazilian economy is the only one in 
Latin America which has apparently introduced 
structural adjustments to cope with the increases 
in the price of oil (PREALC, 1985). The 1984 data 
on Brazil's balance of payments and the esti-
mates for 1985 show an impressive growth in 
the trade-account surplus as a result both of the 
expansion of exports and of extensive imports 
substitution. Brazil was fully dependent on 
imported oil at the beginning of the 1970s. Oil 
imports were reduced from US$ 9 400 million in 
1980 to USS 4 800 million in 1984 by means of 
the heavy expansion of national production of 
alcohol, charcoal and coal. In addition, major 
substitutions were made in cement, pulp and 
paper, petrochemicals, fertilizers, and machin-
ery and equipment. In fact, in some of these 
branches Brazil became an exporter as a result of 
the comparative advantages acquired (Barros de 
Castro, 1985). 
These changes in Brazil's balance of pay-
ments are the fruit of a planned investment 
policy which has taken many years to mature. 
Throughout much of the 1970s the Brazilian 
Government undertook programmes and pro-
jects implemented directly or indirectly by the 
public sector. A large part of this investment 
amounted to direct State intervention in agree-
ment with private enterprises. This is a clear 
example of an association between government 
and private business resulting in major 
investments. 
The Brazilian Government used many tools 
to support private investment. It assured high 
rates of profitability by offering investment 
funds at negative interest rates. In conjunction 
with these incentives, the exports promotion 
policy combined direct negotiations promoted 
by the government to open up new markets with 
subsidies to provide incentives to the private 
sector in external markets (Beckerman, 1986; 
PREALC, 1982). As a result, manufactures today 
account for more than half of Brazil's exports. 
Although the case of Brazil may be consi-
dered exceptional by reason of the negative 
interest rates, the opposite is the case in the 
majority of the countries of Latin America. The 
monetary and fiscal policies pursued during the 
adjustment period combined to produce high 
interest rates which had an adverse effect on 
investment decisions. The high interest rates 
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have been justified as a means of increasing 
domestic saving and encouraging the repatr ia-
tion of the capital which had flowed out of the 
region. In fact, domestic saving appears to be 
relatively uninfluenced by interest rates (Kahn 
and Knight, 1985), and there is no incentive 
voluntarily to return the exported capital owing 
to the economic depression prevailing in the 
countries of the region. Of course, fiscal policy 
could help to increase saving and investment by 
penalizing the distribution of profits and 
rewarding their reinvestment. Moreover, res-
trictions on speculative movements of capital 
could temporarily enhance a more independent 
monetary policy designed to bring interest rates 
down. This does not mean that interest rates 
have to be negative. It is a question of combining 
a gradual liberalization of tariff protection with 
administered restriction of capital movements, 
so that the joint pressure on companies to 
achieve greater productivity coincides with 
incentives to invest. 
It is not enough to correct the external imba-
lance and restore investment levels. There is also 
an historical social debt which has been increa-
sed by the crisis. To service this debt it is neces-
sary to generate productive jobs, increase real 
wages and cater for the essential needs of the 
poorest groups. 
The crisis has brought about a significant 
increase in unemployment and in underemploy-
ment through expansion of the occupations 
most vulnerable thereto (informal and public 
jobs, and employment in tertiary activities and 
small businesses). It is therefore necessary both 
to create jobs and to correct the existing imba-
lances in the structure of employment which 
have led to losses of productivity in the economy. 
This imposes certain conditions on the adjust-
ment, including the need to avoid certain measu-
res which seek to achieve m aero-economic 
balance but have the effect of aggravating the 
social situation. This happens when the reduc-
tion of the public sector following cutbacks in 
expenditure brings about a decline in public 
employment. This sector has played an impor-
tant role in absorbing manpower over the past 
three decades and, in particular, it has played an 
anticyclical role in the present situation and pre-
vented an even sharper rise in the unemploy-
ment rate. Any reduction in public employment 
should be offset by increased absorption in the 
private sector. Unfortunately, the few countries 
which tried to achieve this during the 1970s were 
not effective in shifting employment from one 
sector to the other, and the inevitable result was 
open unemployment (PREALC, 1985 b). 
An analysis should also be made of the rela-
tionship between wages and profits. A policy to 
promote private investment might propose an 
increase in profit margins leaving little room, if 
any at all, for increases in real wages. This issue 
seems even more important when it is remem-
bered that real wages have declined since the 
outbreak of the crisis and that the majority of the 
countries of Latin America have undergone a 
process of democratization. From the political 
standpoint governments need to encourage the 
restoration of real wages and from the technical 
standpoint it seems necessary to explore ways 
(not necessarily new ones) of combining the 
political requirements with the requirements of 
growth. Policies for the distribution of income or 
ownership could be agreed jointly with a view to 
increasing productivity. 
Finally, attention must be given to the ques-
tion of social benefits, in particular social expen-
diture in favour of the poor and unemployed. 
The experience of the past 10 years shows clearly 
that such programmes are the first to be cut back 
when a reduction of public expenditure is 
sought. Moreover, the poorest sectors are the 
ones that have suffered most during the crisis 
and it is unfair, as well as unfeasible in the 
present political conditions in Latin America, to 
think of further cutbacks in the public budget 
affecting them. On the contrary, the challenge is 
how to extend the cover provided by these pro-
grammes. In other words, the problem is how to 
furnish resources to the public sector to cover 
these expenditures rather than to cut back such 
high priority programmes. This ought to lead to 
an analysis of policies of fiscal expenditure and 
income, and not simply from the limited pers-
pective of encouraging the process of private 
accumulation. It is thus necessary to explore the 
restructuring of public expenditure. There is no 
doubt that much public expenditure is excessive: 
military, transfers to weakened financial 
systems, and subsidies which benefit the upper 
levels of the middle class. 
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VII 
Conclusion on adjustment 
The problem which Latin America must tackle is 
not one involving extreme decisions. It is suffi-
cient to point out that the democratic nature of 
many governments of the region would not 
allow exclusive solutions, especially if use is 
made of mechanisms for consulting the organ-
ized social forces and the political sectors. Free 
trade should not be the solution for a closed 
economy. Public intervention should not run 
counter to the laws of the market. The region's 
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experience is that extreme solutions do not work 
efficiently and that a balanced approach is 
needed. This means greater selectivity in the use 
of the instruments and improved timing in the 
interventions of the public sector. The impor-
tant role of the State in the Latin American 
economies is beyond discussion. The question is 
how to make this intervention effective in a 
democratic framework. 
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